

# Hippocrate et les hippocratismes : médecine, religion, société

XIV<sup>e</sup> Colloque International Hippocratique

Jacques Jouanna et Michel Zink éd.

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## PROTO-SYMPATHY IN THE *HIPPOCRATIC CORPUS*

The concept of affections that occur according to “sympathy” (συμπάθεια) has a long life in the history of Western medicine, one extending well beyond classical antiquity<sup>1</sup>. If we are to believe Galen, it is a history that reaches back to the origins of medicine and to Hippocrates himself. More than once in his vast corpus, Galen praises Hippocrates for the aphoristic claim that everything in the body is in sympathy (ξυμπαθέα πάντα). In *On the Natural Faculties*, to take just one example, Galen places Hippocrates at the head of a tradition within natural philosophy committed to the view that substance is continuous and undergoes qualitative change, citing the following passage by way of proof<sup>2</sup>:

Ἴπποκράτης μὲν γὰρ τὴν προτέραν ῥηθεῖσαν ἐτρέπετο, καθ’ ἣν ἦνται μὲν ἡ οὐσία καὶ ἀλλοιοῦται καὶ σύμπνου ὅλον ἐστὶ καὶ σύρρου τὸ σῶμα... (Gal. *Nat. Fac.* 1.12 [II 29 Kühn = 122,6-9 Helmreich])

Hippocrates took the first-mentioned [road], according to which, substance is one and is subject to alteration; there is a consensus in the movements of air and fluid throughout the whole body<sup>3</sup>.

1. Rudolph Siegel traces the concept of sympathetic affections all the way into the nineteenth century (see *Galen’s System of Physiology and Medicine: An Analysis of His Doctrines and Observations on Bloodflow, Respiration, Tumors, and Internal Diseases*, Basel, 1968, pp. 360-382).

2. Galen paraphrases the tag in part or in full elsewhere: see *Caus. Puls.* 1.12 (ix 88 Kühn); *De diff. febr.* (vii 379 Kühn); *MM* 1.2 (x 16 Kühn); *Trem. Palp.* (vii 616 Kühn); *UP* 1.8 (iii 17 Kühn=1.12 Helmreich), 1.9 (iii 24 Kühn=1.17 Helmreich); *Us. Puls.* 1.2 (v 157 Kühn=202,14-16 Furley-Wilkie); 1.5 (v 167 Kühn=214,5-6 Furley-Wilkie). See also [Gal.] *De vict. Hipp. in morb. acut.* 3 (xix 188 Kühn=372,19-21 Westenberger). On Galen’s privileging of a “Hippocratic” philosophy of nature (and the misreadings of earlier texts this entails), see J. Jouanna, “La notion de la nature chez Galien”, in *Galien et la philosophie*, J. Barnes and J. Jouanna ed., Geneva, 2003, pp. 229-268, at pp. 245-257 (reprinted and translated as “Galen’s Concept of Nature”, in J. Jouanna, *Greek Medicine from Hippocrates to Galen: Selected Papers*, Leiden, 2012, pp. 287-312). On Galen’s commitment to the principle of continuity within the body, see P. de Lacy, “Galen’s Concept of Continuity”, *GRBS* XX, 1979, pp. 355-369; A. Debru, “Physiology”, in *The Cambridge Companion to Galen*, R. J. Hankinson ed., Cambridge, 2008, pp. 263-283.

3. All translations are my own unless otherwise noted.



In the next chapter, he repeats the slogan, including now the final remark that “everything is in sympathy” (πάντα συμπαθέα)<sup>4</sup>. Indeed, Galen goes on to frame the most flagrant violation of the Hippocratic position in terms of the denial of sympathy, a crime he lays at the door of the primary target of his vitriol in the treatise, the first-century BCE physician and theorist Asclepiades of Bithynia<sup>5</sup>.

Even when we step away from the fierce contestations of *On the Natural Faculties*, it is not uncommon to find Galen talking about sympathy in Hippocrates’ writings. In his Hippocratic commentaries, we find him regularly describing affections in the source text as happening “according to sympathy” (κατὰ συμπάθειαν)<sup>6</sup>. The concept of sympathetic affections is one that Galen elaborates at some length in his writing, most notably in *On the Affected Parts*, where it relies heavily on precise pathways of veins, arteries, and nerves—the means of conduit for migrating affections. Yet although Galen seems to have fleshed out the concept of sympathetic affection and embedded it within his own model of the networked body, it is unlikely that he alone is responsible for its development in medical writing, as Rudolph Siegel alleges<sup>7</sup>. For the language of sympathy is found in similar contexts in Soranus and other imperial-age Greek medical texts, and Galen himself indicates that the term was in general circulation in his own age<sup>8</sup>. The analogous Latin term *consensus* appears some fifty times in Caelius

4. Gal. *Nat. Fac.* 1.13 (II 39 Kühn=129,7-12 Helmreich); cf. 3.13 (II 196 Kühn=243,10-13 Helmreich).

5. κατὰ δὲ τὸν Ἀσκληπιάδην οὐδὲν οὐδενὶ συμπαθὲς ἔστι φύσει, διηρημένης τε καὶ κατατεθραυσμένης εἰς ἄναρμα στοιχεῖα καὶ ληρώδεις ὄγκους ἀπάσης τῆς οὐσίας (According to Asclepiades, however, nothing is naturally in sympathy with anything else, all substance being divided and broken up into inharmonious elements and absurd “molecules”, Gal. *Nat. Fac.* 1.13 (II 39 Kühn=129,10-12 Helmreich)).

6. On Galen’s attribution of sympathy to Hippocrates in his commentaries, see Brooke Holmes, “Sympathy between Hippocrates and Galen: The Case of Galen’s Commentary on *Epidemics II*”, in *Epidemics in Context: Hippocrates, Galen and Hunayn Between East and West*, Peter E. Pormann ed., Berlin, 2012, pp. 49-70.

7. Siegel (*op. cit.* n. 1), pp. 361-362.

8. Sor. *Gyn.* 1.63 (47,16 Ilberg), 1.67 (48,25 Ilberg), 2.11 (58,11 Ilberg), 2.49 (88,22 Ilberg), 3.17 (105,17 Ilberg), 3.20 (106,19 Ilberg), 3.22, *bis* (107,18; 107,27 Ilberg), 3.25 (109,8 Ilberg), 3.29 (113,6 Ilberg), 3.31 (114,6 Ilberg), 3.41, *bis* (120,13; 121,12 Ilberg), 3.49 (127,11 Ilberg), 4.7 (137,7 Ilberg), 4.9 (140,7 Ilberg), 4.15 [1.72], *tris* (145,16; 145,18; 145,29 Ilberg). See also Anon. *Med. Morb. Acut.* 7.3.11 (54,27 Garofalo), 22.2.2 (172,5 Garofalo), 37.2.2 (194,1 Garofalo), 40.2.4 (246,19 Garofalo); Cassius, *Quaestiones medicae* 21 (152,3 Ideler), 40 (158,13 Ideler), 83 (167,15-16 Ideler); Severus, *De instrumentis et infusoriis* 24,3-7 Dietz, 30,14-16 Dietz. For references in Galen that suggest widespread use of the term, see, e.g., *Hipp. Epid. III* (XVII/A 520 Kühn=24,6-7 Wenkebach); *Loc. Aff.* 2.10 (VIII 127 Kühn). See further Brooke Holmes, “Disturbing Connections: Sympathetic Affections, Mental Disorder, and Galen’s Elusive Soul”, in *Mental Disorders in Classical Antiquity*, W. V. Harris ed., Leiden, 2013, pp. 147-176, at pp. 164-165.

Aurelianus, who also uses the verb *consentire*<sup>9</sup>. On Galen's genealogy, all these writers are simply following in the footsteps of Hippocrates.

To anyone familiar with Galen's projections of his own medical system onto Hippocrates, the ambitious claims he makes on behalf of Hippocrates with respect to sympathy will sound suspicious. There are grounds for misgivings. For one thing, the language of sympathy occurs nowhere in Hippocratic texts dating from the fifth and fourth centuries BCE. We also have reason to be wary of Galen's claims if we take a closer look at the ostensibly Hippocratic passage that he repeatedly cites in support of his philosophy of nature. It appears in the treatise *On Nutriment*:

ξύρροια μία, ξύμπνοια μία, ξυμπαθέα πάντα· κατὰ μὲν οὐλομελίην πάντα, κατὰ μέρος δὲ τὰ ἐν ἑκάστῳ μέρει μέρεια πρὸς τὸ ἔργον. (*Nutr.* 23 [ix 106 Littré=143,4-6 Joly])

There is one confluence; there is one common breathing; all things are in sympathy. All the parts as forming a whole, and severally the parts in each part, with reference to the work.

Yet if physicians and philosophers from John Philoponus to Leibniz have, like Galen, attributed these lines to Hippocrates, modern historians have been loathe to date the treatise any earlier than the third century BCE (and in some cases earlier than the imperial period), with the result that it is not even considered Hippocratic—that is, part of the classical-era *Hippocratic Corpus*—let alone a genuine work of the historical Hippocrates<sup>10</sup>. One reason an early date is

9. Brigitte Maire and Olivier Bianchi, *Caelii Aureliani operum omnium quae exstant concordantiae*, 4 vols., Hildesheim, 2003, vol. 1, pp. 430-432 give examples of the term *consensus* (50 times) et *consentire* (38 times) in Caelius Aurelianus: see, e.g., *Morb. Acut.* 1.71 (62,17-18 Bendz), 3.140 (376,21 Bendz); *Morb. Chron.* 1.62 (464,24 Bendz), 2.25 (558,18 Bendz), 2.27 (560,3 Bendz), 3.69 (720,16 Bendz).

10. See John Philoponus, *In Aristotelis de generatione et corruptione* 1.5 CAG XIV 2 (106,33f. Vitelli); *De aeternitate mundi* 7.17 (283,19f. Rabe) (I owe these references to Jouanna [art. cit., n. 2] p. 255 n. 80, who also cites Stephanus, *Commentarii in priorem Galeni librum therapeuticum ad Glauconem* [220,5 Dickson=1.321,35-322,1 Dietz]); G. W. Leibniz, *Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement*, in *Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe*, Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften ed., Berlin, 1923-, VI, vi, 54 and *Monadology* §61. On the dating of *On Nutriment*, see H. Diller, "Eine stoisch-pneumatische Schrift in Corpus Hippocraticum", *Archiv für Geschichte der Medizin* XXIX, 1936, pp. 178-195 (reprinted in *Kleine Schriften zur antiken Medizin*, Berlin, 1973, pp. 17-30); K. Deichgräber, *Pseudhippokrates Über die Nahrung: Text, Kommentar und Würdigung einer stoisch-heraklitisierenden Schrift aus der Zeit um Christi Geburt*, Mainz, 1973, pp. 69-75; R. Joly, "Remarques sur le 'De Alimento' pseudo-hippocratique", in *Le monde grec : pensée, littérature, histoire, documents ; hommages à Claire Preaux*, J. Bingen, G. Cambier, and G. Nachtergaeal ed., Brussels, 1975, pp. 271-276; J. Jouanna, *Hippocrates*, transl. M. De Bevoise, Baltimore, 1999, p. 401. Cf. Siegel (*op. cit.* n. 1), p. 361, who treats *On Nutriment* unproblematically as a work of

unlikely is precisely the Stoic-sounding language (συμπαθία, σύμπνοια) of our passage<sup>11</sup>.

In the face of such difficulties, should we just chalk up the idea of sympathy in the *Hippocratic Corpus* to Galen's penchant for anachronism? The answer turns out to be complicated. It is true that what eventually gets described in terms of sympathy (συμπάθεια, *consensus*) by Galen and other medical writers does not appear ex nihilo. If "Hippocrates" does not preach the gospel of sympathy, strictly speaking, fifth- and fourth-century medical models of the body and its affections nevertheless exhibit on more than one occasion what we might call "proto-sympathetic" tendencies.

These tendencies can be seen from two angles, reflecting a twofold notion of sympathy that has already been intimated above. The primary sense of the term in later medical writing is, as we have seen, the communication of an affection from one part of the body to another part, usually remote from the original site (although sympathy by contact is also recognized): virtually all the instances of the word συμπάθεια in Galen, for example, fall into this category<sup>12</sup>.

Yet in Galen, sympathy may also be enlisted in support of a model of how the physical body works and, more broadly still, a philosophy of nature. It is this more expansive frame of reference that Galen activates when he paraphrases the divine "Hippocrates" to assert that "everything is in sympathy". The concept of sympathy in play here is not unrelated to the concept of sympathetic affections, at least in Galen's eyes. Each insists, for example, on a model of the body marked by interconnectivity and communication among parts; each causes Galen to mention the magnet, the paradigm of sympathy in antiquity<sup>13</sup>. In the earlier writings, too, the interest in the circulation of affections can contribute to a more self-conscious model of the body as a whole, as we will see in *On Places in a Human Being*. Nonetheless, the sympathy invoked by the passage from *On Nutriment* moves Galen beyond the local plane of sympathetic affections to a

Hippocrates. Galen shows no signs of doubting its Hippocratic provenance: see also the citation of *Nutr.* 34 (ix 110 Littré) at *Protr.* (i 25 Kühn); I owe this reference to David Leith.

11. On the Stoic elements, see Diller (art. cit. n. 10). On Stoic sympathy, see, e.g., Chrysippus in Alexander, *On Mixture* 3 (216, 14-17 Bruns; see also 227, 8 Bruns) (*SVF* 2.473); Cicero, *Div.* 2.33-34 (*SVF* 2.1211); *Nat. D.* 2.19; Cleomedes, *Caelestia* 1.1.13 (*SVF* 2.534), 1.1.69-73 (*SVF* 2.546); Diogenes Laërtius 7.140 (*SVF* 2.543); [Plutarch], *Fat.* 574E (*SVF* 2.912); Sextus Empiricus, *Math.* 9.78-80 (*SVF* 2.1013). See further René Brouwer, "Stoic Sympathy", in *Sympathy*, Eric Schliesser ed., New York, forthcoming.

12. See Holmes (art. cit. n. 10), pp. 165-172.

13. *Hipp. Epid.* II 2.103 (236, 32-44 Pfaff); *Nat. Fac.* 1.14 (II 44-52 Kühn=133, 11-139, 9 Helmreich).

level of abstraction and generality where the philosophical stakes are high, as Galen himself makes clear. The influence of Stoicism is evident here, although even the more philosophical concept of sympathy deployed by Galen is not isomorphic with its Stoic incarnation<sup>14</sup>.

It is precisely the ideological baggage that sympathy is saddled with in Galen's references to *On Nutriment* that makes it difficult to see it as entirely at home within classical medical writing, at least in its more philosophically expansive sense. It may seem easier to trace the narrower idea of sympathetic affections back to the early writings of the *Corpus*; and, in fact, the idea that diseased matter, damage, or pain can travel throughout the body is found in virtually all the authors in the *Hippocratic Corpus*. Yet even here the situation is not straightforward. The identification of sympathy in later writing emphasizes the part of the body primarily affected. But while the parts of the body have a place in earlier texts, they have neither the prominence nor the functionality that they acquire later on, with the result that the communication of affections is often inflected differently by these authors. All of this means that when Galen or modern commentators speak of sympathy in these texts, they do so on the basis of postclassical frameworks of interpretation. In short, the story of "proto-sympathy" is a case study for a core principle of reception studies—namely, that the view of the past is shaped by what intervenes between it and the present.

The idea of proto-sympathetic tendencies, then, needs to be handled with care. In this essay, I survey cases where fifth- and fourth-century BCE Hippocratic authors incorporate or develop, explicitly and implicitly, concepts that become foundational for sympathy as it will be identified by later authors, focusing on one text in particular, *On Places in a Human Being*. But I also point to factors that confound the identification of sympathy *avant la lettre* in classical medical writing: the relative unimportance of the parts vis-à-vis the fluid dynamics of the humors and the absence of the ideological framework governing Galen's reading of the passage from *On Nutriment* and his understanding more generally of "Hippocrates'" philosophy of the body. That Galen distorts the classical past in laying claim to it will hardly come as a surprise to historians of ancient medicine. What I aim to do here is sketch out the nature of those distortions alongside a consideration of material that is salient to a larger history of sympathy and sympathetic affections.

14. Galen acknowledges the Stoic associations of sympathy but claims that the Stoics have simply adopted their views on nature from Hippocrates: see *MM* 1.2 (x 16 Kühn). On the multifaceted notion of sympathy in *On the Natural Faculties*, see Brooke Holmes, "Galen on the Chances of Life", in *Probabilities, Hypotheticals, and Counterfactuals in Ancient Greek Thought*, Victoria Wohl ed., Cambridge, 2014, pp. 230-250.

From one perspective, the majority of the affections in the *Hippocratic Corpus* are sympathetic: disease rarely stays in one place in classical medical writing. Indeed, one of the fundamental tenets of humoral pathology is that the same vessels that allow life-giving fluid and air to circulate throughout the body also enable the movement of noxious stuffs.

The principle is articulated with particular clarity in the opening pages of *On Places in a Human Being*. Each part of the body, upon falling ill, produces disease in another part (e.g., the cavity in the head, and vice versa)<sup>15</sup>. The principle here is usually that of overflow. If the cavity, for example, fails to evacuate food that has been ingested, it floods other parts of the body with fluids, sending them first to the head and then, if there is no space there to contain them, to the brain, the bones, and then sometimes back to the cavity. The traffic in fluids both here and elsewhere in the treatise obeys basic laws of attraction that are familiar from other Hippocratic treatises: fluids are attracted to hollow areas or dry parts of the body (the head, for example, acts like a cupping glass in attracting fluids upwards)<sup>16</sup>. These fluids largely circulate through “vessels” (φλέβες, φλέβια) that “communicate and flow into one another” (κοινωνέουσι [...] καὶ διαρρέουσιν ἐς ἑαυτάς). Some of these join (ξυμβάλλουσιν) up with each other directly; others flow into (διαρρέουσι) one another by joining the small vessels branching off from the vessels that nourish the tissue<sup>17</sup>.

The idea that the vessels form a network of roadways in the body is common to a number of treatises in the *Corpus*; the verbs κοινωνέω and κοινωνέω are also used in the surgical treatises to describe structures, especially vessels, that “communicate” with one another<sup>18</sup>. Nevertheless, *On Places in a Human Being* offers one of the most complex Hippocratic models of the vascular system, an unsurprising feature in a text so interested in the movement of matter within the body<sup>19</sup>. Indeed, as anatomical investigation becomes more systematic in later

15. *Loc.* 1 (vi 276 Littré=36,9-15 Craik).

16. See Beate Gundert, “Parts and their Roles in Hippocratic Medicine”, *Isis* LXXXIII, 1992, pp. 453-465, esp. pp. 458-462 and p. 460 n. 94 for textual citations. On attraction, see also Michel Roussel, “La notion de traction dans le Corpus Hippocratique : vers une étude globale”, in *Formes de pensée dans la Collection hippocratique*, François Lasserre and Philippe Mudry ed., Geneva, 1983, pp. 423-426.

17. *Loc.* 3 (vi 282 Littré=40,30-31 Craik).

18. See *Artic.* 13 (iv 118 Littré=134,8 Kühlewein), 45 (iv 190 Littré=172,3 Kühlewein), 86 (iv 324 Littré=243,8 Kühlewein); *Fract.* 9 (iii 450 Littré=62,4 Kühlewein), 10 (iii 450 Littré=62,15 Kühlewein), 11 (iii 452 Littré 3.452=63,15 Kühlewein). See also the use of *koinōniē* at *Artic.* 45 (iii 556 Littré=107,10-108,5 Kühlewein) to refer to the “connections” or “communications” of the veins and arteries.

19. In a similar way, Wesley Smith has argued that the worked-out account of the vascular system in *Epidemics II* reflects “a systematic interest in getting control of the body’s means of



centuries, it facilitates a more precise account of how not only stuffs but also affections travel within the body<sup>20</sup>. The concept of sympathy does not require an anatomical scaffolding. Yet it may be enforced by an underlying map of how affections travel from one place to another, as we see in Galen<sup>21</sup>. In *On Places in a Human Being*, too, the careful tracking of routes by which fluids move through the body from place to place supports the description of migratory affections, affections that seem to look forward to those that will be later identified as occurring according to sympathy.

The migration of fluid (and hence, disease) itself contributes to a more self-conscious model of the body in the treatise. In Chapter 9, the author speaks of a body that, to the extent that it divides and draws moisture to its different parts, “communicates with itself” (τὸ σῶμα κοινωνεῖν αὐτὸ ἐωυτῷ)<sup>22</sup>. The loop of self-reflexivity referenced here, building on the idea of interconnecting vessels, recalls the evocative image with which the treatise had begun, that of the circle:

ἔμοι δοκεῖ ἀρχὴ μὲν οὐκ οὐδεμία εἶναι τοῦ σώματος, ἀλλὰ πάντα ὁμοίως ἀρχὴ καὶ πάντα τελευτή· κύκλου γὰρ γραφέντος ἀρχὴ οὐκ εὐρέθη. (*Loc.* 1, vi 276 Littré=36,1-3 Craik)

It seems to me that there is no beginning point of the body, but every part is beginning and end alike, as the beginning point of the figure of a circle is not found.

The circle was a source of considerable fascination in this period. It was Heraclitus who is best known for observing that in the circumference of a circle, the beginning and the end are common<sup>23</sup>. That observation, which may or may

communication, defining them, mapping the channels, and learning to manipulate them” (Wesley D. Smith, “Generic Form in *Epidemics I to VII*”, in *Die hippokratischen Epidemien: Theorie-Praxis-Tradition; Verhandlungen des V<sup>o</sup> Colloque international hippocratique*, G. Baader and R. Winau ed., Stuttgart, 1989, pp. 144-158, at p. 151). For a fuller discussion of the vascular model in *On Places in a Human Being*, see Marie-Paule Duminil, *Le sang, les vaisseaux, le cœur dans la collection hippocratique*, Paris, 1983, pp. 79-82.

20. Duminil (*op. cit.* n. 19), p. 128-131, argues that this process is already under way in the *Hippocratic Corpus*: as the medico-philosophical understanding of the vascular system improved in later fifth and fourth centuries, she claims, writers were more constrained in imagining the circulation of stuffs within the body. Her account of the development of vascular knowledge in the *Corpus* is a bit too neat, but her insight that anatomy can shape an understanding of sympathetic affections is borne out in Galen: see the next note.

21. Galen repeatedly emphasizes the importance of anatomy to an understanding of sympathy: see *Loc. Aff.* 1.6 (viii 57, viii 60-63 Kühn), 3.14 (viii 208 Kühn), 4.7 (viii 257 Kühn).

22. *Loc.* 9 (vi 292 Littré=48,13-14 Craik). E. M. Craik, *Hippocrates, Places in Man*, Oxford, 1998, p. 133, n. 27, notes the greater care that goes into the composition of this chapter, in line with its more self-conscious stance.

23. DK 22 B103. See also Alcmaeon DK24 B2 and A1, with C. Mugler, “Alcméon et les

not have been associated with Heraclitus, seems to have become widespread by the later fifth century. In addition to launching *On Places in a Human Being*, it appears in *On the Nature of Bones*, where the circle is appropriated to describe a “single vessel” within the body, from which all the other vessels branch off<sup>24</sup>. The point is that there is no beginning point nor endpoint and, as in *On Places in a Human Being*, it goes hand in hand with a focus on the pathways crisscrossing the body. Finally, in *On Regimen*, the author compares the circuit (περίοδος) in the body, along which the soul travels, to the path that is traced by a basket weaver plaiting a basket: in both cases, one ends up where one had begun<sup>25</sup>.

The appeal to the circle in the opening lines of *On Places in a Human Being*, then, offers further evidence for the self-consciousness of the author’s understanding of a unified, internally communicating body that is built around the circulating fluids—especially corrupted fluids—so integral to early medical pathology<sup>26</sup>. The model of the body in play here arguably looks forward to the body that flows together and breathes together and suffers together of *On Nutriment*<sup>27</sup>; the step to the providentially organized body praised by Galen is a more distant and less direct one, as I argue further below. That is, this model opens up to sympathy in the more expansive sense outlined above, in addition to supporting the circulation of affections in ways that seem to anticipate the movement of “sympathetic” affections.

The idea of a body in communication with itself is expressed in a second, rather different way by the author of *On Places in a Human Being*, in a discussion of pleasure and pain:

τὸ δὲ σῶμα αὐτὸ ἐωυτῷ τωῦτόν ἐστι καὶ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν σύγκειται, ὁμοίως δὲ οὐ ἐχόντων, καὶ τὰ μικρὰ αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰ μεγάλα καὶ τὰ κάτω καὶ τὰ ἄνω· καὶ εἴ τις βούλεται τοῦ σώματος ἀπολαβὼν μέρος κακῶς ποιεῖν τὸ μικρότατον, πᾶν τὸ σῶμα αἰσθήσεται τὴν πείσιν, ὁποῖα ἂν τις ᾖ, διὰ τὸδε ὅτι τοῦ σώματος τὸ μικρότατον

cycles physiologiques de Platon”, *Revue des études grecques* LXXI, 1958, pp. 42-50.

24. *Nat. Oss.* 11 (ix 182 Littré=149,14-18 Duminil). The passage was the locus of considerable controversy in the last century when it was taken to prove that the Hippocratic author had already, well before Harvey, understood the circulation of the blood, a thesis that has since been discredited: see C. R. S. Harris, *The Heart and Vascular System in Ancient Greek Medicine, from Alcmaeon to Galen*, Oxford, 1973, pp. 48-49; Duminil (*op. cit.* n. 19), pp. 281-287.

25. *Vict.* I 19 (vi 492-494 Littré=138,28-29 Joly-Byl). R. Joly, *Recherches sur le traité pseudo-hippocratique Du Régime*, Paris, 1960, p. 65, lists parallels to this passage.

26. See also O. Temkin, “Der Systematische Zusammenhang im Corpus Hippocraticum”, *Kyklos*, I, 1928, pp. 9-43.

27. Craik (*op. cit.* n. 22), p. 114 cites *Nutr.* 23 in connection with the author’s account of the vascular system. I. M. Lonie, “Hippocrates the Iatromechanist”, *Medical History*, XXV, 1981, pp. 113-150, at p. 140, cites it in connection with the author’s appeal to the circle.

πάντα ἔχει, ὅσα περ καὶ τὸ μέγιστον· τοῦτο δ' ὅποιον ἂν τι πάθῃ, τὸ μικρότατον ἐπαναφέρει πρὸς τὴν ὁμοεθνήν ἕκαστον πρὸς τὴν ἑωυτοῦ, ἦν τε κακόν, ἦν τε ἀγαθόν ἢ· καὶ διὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἀλγεῖ καὶ ἡδεται ὑπὸ ἔθνεος τοῦ μικροτάτου τὸ σῶμα, ὅτι ἐν τῷ μικροτάτῳ πάντ' ἐνὶ τὰ μέρεα, καὶ ταῦτα ἐπαναφέρουσιν ἐς τὰ σφέων αὐτῶν ἕκαστα, καὶ ἐξαγγέλλουσι πάντα. (*Loc.* 1, VI 278 Littré=36,26-38,3 Craik)

The body is itself identical to itself and composed of the same things, although not in uniform disposition, both its small parts and its large parts, those below and those above. And if someone should take the smallest part of the body and cause it harm, the whole body will feel the damage, of whatever sort it is, for the reason that the smallest part of the body has all the things that the greatest part has. Whatever the smallest part experiences, it passes it on to its related part, each to that which is related to it, whether it is something good or bad. The body, on account of these things, feels pain and pleasure from the smallest constituent, because in the smallest part all the parts are present, and these communicate with the parts that are their own and inform them of everything.

In this passage, the migration of an affection is understood in terms of a “relatedness” (ὁμοεθνή) that joins the “smallest parts” of the body to one another. These “smallest parts” are distinguished from the larger structures of the body, such as the head or the cavity, presumably because they constitute something like the body’s basic “building blocks”<sup>28</sup>. What is emphasized here, at any rate, is that these parts belong to a community (ἔθνος) where each “announces” (ἐπαναφέρει) pain and pleasure to the others. Rather than imagining parts conjoined by vessels, then, as in the rest of the treatise, in this context the author has in mind a whole that suffers together with each of its parts. Moreover, the model here seems to suggest that what is communicated is the feeling of pleasure or pain rather than an actual substance, as in the circulation of morbid humors<sup>29</sup>.

28. Mario Vegetti, “Il *De locis in homine* fra Anassagora ed Ippocrate”, *Istituto Lombardo (Rend. Lett.)* XCIX, 1965, pp. 193-213, at pp. 201-203, in keeping with his view that the treatise was written by a member of Anaxagoras’ circle, sees here the influence of Anaxagorean ideas of mixture (esp. DK 59 B6). See also E. M. Craik (*op. cit.* n. 22), p. 100.

29. It is unclear what it means for the whole body to feel (αἰσθίσεται) the damage to or flourishing of a smallest part: is the reference to the perception of damage or actual damage to related parts and the whole body itself? For the ambiguity of the verb αἰσθάνομαι in medical and philosophical writing of the period, see Brooke Holmes, *The Symptom and the Subject: The Emergence of the Physical Body in Ancient Greece*, Princeton, 2010, pp. 111-112. See also, on the communication of affections to the whole body, Plato, *Tim.* 64a-65a.

The idea of a part communicating its pain to the entire body will be used by the Stoics to illustrate by analogy the unified and internally connected cosmos: “If the finger is cut, the whole body suffers with it. The cosmos, too, then, is a unified body” (εἴ γε δακτύλου τεμνομένου τὸ ὅλον συνδιατίθεται σῶμα. ἡνωμένον τοῖνυν ἐστὶ σῶμα καὶ ὁ κόσμος)<sup>30</sup>. The movement from the body to the whole cosmos suggests that the Stoic model of macrocosmic sympathy may be based on models of microcosmic sympathy (in an interesting twist on the apparent appropriation of Stoic ideas in *On Nutriment*)<sup>31</sup>. If the work that the figure performs in *On Places in a Human Being* is more limited, it nevertheless powerfully confirms the Hippocratic author’s commitment to a model of the body as an integrated whole, rather than an agglomeration of parts. In this respect, the language of *homoethniē* and *ethnos* is especially intriguing. In other Hippocratic treatises, *ethnos* is used of a group of people living together, often under the same climatic and environmental conditions<sup>32</sup>. But the claim that the parts of the body form an *ethnos* is found only here.

The term *homoethniē* does appear one other time, in *Diseases of Women II*, where a uterine affection causes the breasts to swell according to their “relatedness”<sup>33</sup>. Rather than supporting the idea of a community at the micro-level of the body, however, as in *On Places in a Human Being*, the bond between the uterus and the breasts in the gynecological text takes us back to the relationship between parts at the macro-level, as in the first expression of proto-sympathy that we examined.

Yet at the same time, the part-to-part relationship here has its own contours. In *On Places in a Human Being*, fluid circulates from one part to another according to mechanical principles outlined in the description of fluxes. If some pathways are especially well trafficked, as is the one between the head and the cavity, it is because of the nature of the structure involved (e.g., the head is large and hollow and thus attracts fluids from the cavity). There is an element of contingency at work here: the author speaks frequently of the fluid flowing

30. Sextus Empiricus, *Math.* 9.80 (*SVF* 2.1013). See also Alexander, *Mantissa* §3 (117,10-22 Bruns), responding to the Stoics.

31. For the suggestion that Stoic macrocosmic sympathy is indebted to microcosmic models, perhaps drawn from medicine, see Brouwer (art. cit. n. 11); Brouwer is, however, looking primarily at the notion of sympathy between body and soul.

32. For *ethnos* as a group of people in the *Hippocratic Corpus*, see *Aer.* 12 (II 52 Littré=219,12 Jouanna), 13 (II 56 Littré=222,11 Jouanna), 17 (II 66 Littré=230,6 Jouanna); *Vict.* II 37 (VI 528 Littré=158,5 Joly-Byl). At *Flat.* 6 (VI 98 Littré=110,4 Jouanna), it refers to “species” of living beings.

33. *Mul.* II 174 (VIII 354 Littré). These are the only two extant examples of the word in Greek literature.

“wherever it chances to go”<sup>34</sup> ; in other writings, too, noxious fluids move according to shifting conditions, to wherever they are attracted or via the path of least resistance<sup>35</sup>. By contrast, in *Diseases of Women II*, the *homo*-prefix suggests that the bond between the uterus and the breasts should be chalked up to a kind of natural affinity<sup>36</sup>. The uterus-breast connection is also singled out in *Epidemics II*, where it is described not in terms of *homoethniē* but in terms of *koinōniē*:

πολλὰ δὲ καὶ τῶν τοιούτων, οἷον ἀποφθειρουσέων οἱ τιτθοὶ προσισχναίνονται· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐναντίον οὐδὲ βῆχες χρόνιαι ὅτι ὄρχις οἰδήσαντος παύονται· ὄρχις οἰδήσας ὑπὸ βηχωδέων ὑπόμνημα κοινωνίης στηθέων, μαζῶν, γονῆς, φωνῆς. (*Epid. II* 1.6, v 76 Littré)<sup>37</sup>

There are many phenomena of this kind, as when, in women who are about to abort, the breasts completely wither up. For there is no contradiction even in that chronic coughs subside following the swelling of a testicle. The testicle that has swollen because of the coughs is a reminder of the relationship between the chest, the breasts, the genitals, and the voice.

Much as in the gynecological text, this author seems interested in a smaller community of parts within the larger body, not just the breast and the uterus, but more generally “chest, breasts, genitals, voice”. Such a community appears to be underwritten by affinities between the parts in question and these affinities, in turn, seem to set the stage for the sharing of affections<sup>38</sup>. That is not to say that the privileged relationship between chest, breast, genitals, and voice precludes vascular connections among the parts; indeed, some Hippocratic texts do imply communicating vessels that join these parts<sup>39</sup>. Yet the connections may be indi-

34. E.g., *Loc. I* (vi 276 Littré=36,21-22 Craik): ἦν δ’ ἄλλη πη τύχη, ἄλλη νοῦσον ποιέει; 9 (vi 292 Littré=48,11 Craik): ρεῖ δὲ ἢ ἄν τύχη.

35. See Gundert (art. cit. n. 16), p. 464, with nn. 133-137.

36. For the *homo*- prefix, see also *Nat. Hom.* 3 (vi 38 Littré=170,10 Jouanna): ὁμόφυλος; *Vict.* I 6 (vi 480 Littré=130,8 Joly-Byl): ὁμοτρόπος.

37. I print Robert Alessi’s unpublished text for the Budé series here and throughout; I am grateful to him for making it available to me. I have also consulted Smith’s Loeb edition and the edition of Littré.

38. In non-Hippocratic sources, the existence of *koinōniē/koinōnia* between parts goes together with sympathy. See, for example, Arist. *De an.* 407b13-26, on the *koinōnia* of the *sōma* and the *psychē*. On the co-suffering of the *sōma* and the *psychē*, see *De an.* 403a3-5. See also Gal. *UP* 14.4 (iv 154 Kühn=293,16-20 Helmreich); 1.8 (iv 179 Kühn=312,23-313,3 Helmreich) on the *koinōnia* of the breasts and the uterus.

39. On the breasts and the uterus, see, e.g., *Aph.* 5.50 (iv 550 Littré); *Genit./Nat. Puer.* 21 (vii 510-514 Littré=67,9-68,18 Joly); *Glan.* 16 (viii 570-572 Littré=121,11-20 Joly); *Mul.* II 133 (viii 282 Littré), with Lesley Dean-Jones, *Women’s Bodies in Classical Greek Science*, Oxford, 1994, pp. 215-222. On the relationship between the genitals and the voice, see also *Epid. II* 5.1 (v 128 Littré) (the testicle and the voice). The relationship is discussed with respect to the female body

cated, as in *Epidemics II*, without any mention of underlying conduits. Most important, the mention of *homoethniē* in *Diseases of Women II* puts the stress on a community constituted by bonds that transcend mechanical dynamics and the existence of a common vessel.

One of the factors that distinguishes these last two passages is their emphasis on the parts themselves as members of a sub-community within the body. The passage in *On Places in a Human Being* on the communication of damage throughout the whole body also foregrounds the parts, *merē*, in relation to one another and to a whole. The emphasis on parts has consequences for how we understand the antecedents of affections “according to sympathy”. That is because the more crisply a part is delineated within the larger vascular web, the more it can lay claim to an affection as proper to it; in turn, once it is allied with a part, the affection can be communicated to or shared with another part.

The identity of parts is pronounced in other passages in the *Hippocratic Corpus* where we find the language of shared affections. The author of *On Joints*, for example, compares serious damage that is nevertheless contained locally to more minor injuries that are shared with the rest of the body (κοινωνέοντα τῷ ἄλλῳ σώματι ἐπὶ πλέον)<sup>40</sup>. The author of *Prorrhetic II* writes that facial distortions quickly disappear as long as they are not in communication with (ἐπικοινωνέη) another part of the body<sup>41</sup>. In *On Glands*, the glands are said to “give” their disease to the rest of the body when they fall ill, but they rarely “suffer together” (συμπονέουσιν) with the body when it ails<sup>42</sup>. Similarly, the fourth-century BCE medical writer Diocles of Carystus speaks of the heart changing its condition *together with* the diaphragm in phrenitis (συνδιατιθεμένης καὶ τῆς καρδίας)<sup>43</sup>. These examples home in on a particular part or place (joints, the face, the glands, the heart, the diaphragm) and then place it in communication with either another part or the rest of the body through the shared affection.

by Dean-Jones (*op. cit.*), pp. 72-73; Helen King, *Hippocrates' Woman: Reading the Female Body in Ancient Greece*, London, 1998, pp. 49-51, 68-69; Paola Manuli, “Donne mascoline, femmine sterili, vergini perpetue: la ginecologia greca tra Ippocrate e Sorano”, in *Madre materia: Sociologia e biologia della donna greca*, S. Campese, P. Manuli, and G. Sissa ed., Turin, 1983, pp. 147-192, at p. 157. For popular ideas about the relationship of a woman’s “two mouths,” see D. Armstrong and A. E. Hanson, “Two Notes on Greek Tragedy”, in *BICS XXXIII*, 1986, pp. 97-102. The mouth, of course, is not the same as the voice. Nevertheless, it seems likely that the “tube” assumed by these authors would be sufficient to relate changes in the sexual organs to those of the voice. Cf. Duminil (*op. cit.* n. 19) p. 121, who posits Arist. *Gen. an.* 4.8, where Aristotle locates the principle of the voice close to the source of the spermatic vessels in the heart, as the missing link between the voice and the genitals in *Epidemics II*.

40. *Artic.* 49 (iv 216 Littré=184,13 Kühlewein); see also 41 (iv 180 Littré=165,14 Kühlewein).

41. *Prorrh.* II 38 (ix 68 Littré=284 Potter).

42. *Glan.* 2 (viii 556 Littré=66,8-9 Joly).

43. Fr. 72 (van der Eijk); see also fr. 80 (van der Eijk).



By contrast, for all that parts of the body featured in *On Places in a Human Being*, the treatise's emphasis on fluxes points to another way of framing the phenomenon that I have been calling proto-sympathy—namely, one in which the emphasis is less on the parts and the relationship between those parts and more on the material trafficked between them or the pathways along which it travels. More specifically, whereas the identification of an affection “according to sympathy” tends to locate the disease or affection in a part or parts (usually distinguishing between the primary site of the affection and the secondary site), a focus on migrating stuffs, especially fluids, sees the disease or affection as primarily nomadic, insofar as it inheres in things that are in constant motion<sup>44</sup>. In such a context, the parts become stations on a circuit rather than entities that develop their own affections.

From one perspective, the shift of emphasis is subtle. In both models, you have parts that are adversely affected and, in most cases, a means by which harm is transported or communicated (sympathy by contact is also a possibility; moreover, the means of transport is not always made explicit). The prominence of the affected places in Galen, for example, goes hand in hand with an interest in vascular pathways and the vehicles of harm (these include humors but also vapors and what Siegel calls “nerve conduction” and “inhibition by nerve conduction”)<sup>45</sup>. Similarly, the author of *On Places in a Human Being* is invested in both the network of vessels and locations in the body. And in several texts, the movements of fluids from one part of the body to another that result in the relief of suffering in the first part are referred to as “communications” (κοινωνία), the word connoting both a community of parts conjoined by vessels and the circulation of fluids<sup>46</sup>.

From another perspective, however, the identification of the disease with fluids or other circulating matter brings out the relative unimportance of the parts

44. The author of *On Places in a Human Being* puts considerable emphasis on those diseases that are in motion throughout the body and those that are fixed; the latter are associated with the dry parts of the body, especially the “cords” (νεῦρα): see *Loc.* I (v1 276 Littré=36,5-8 Craik), 4 (v1 282-284 Littré=43,1-2 Craik).

45. For example, Galen devotes considerable discussion to the venous and arterial connections between the breasts and the uterus (which he sees as related by sympathy): see, e.g., *UP* 14.4-5 (iv 154 Kühn=2.292-96 Helmreich), 14.8 (v 176-179 Kühn=2.310-313 Helmreich); *Ven. Art. Diss.* 8 (ii 813 Kühn), with Siegel (*op. cit.* n. 1), pp. 367-368. At *Hipp. Epid. II* 1.75 (173,27-28 Pfaff), he provides an explanation for the connection between chest, breasts, genitals, and voice in *Epidemics II* by referencing the vascular relationships: see Holmes (*art. cit.* n. 6), pp. 55-65. Siegel identifies five types of sympathy (*op. cit.* n. 1, pp. 362-370): by nerve conduction, inhibition of nerve conduction, via humors, via vapors, and by contact.

46. See *Epid. VI* 3.23 (v 304 Littré=76,4-5 Manetti-Roselli); *Hum.* 20 (v 500 Littré). It is possible that *koinōniē* came to function as a technical term to denote this phenomenon in the fourth century.

of the body in most Hippocratic texts, compared with later texts. As has been widely noted, the predominance of the humors in Hippocratic physiology and pathology casts the parts in a supporting role in most texts, where they exist mostly “to serve as receptacles or passages for the humors”<sup>47</sup>. In Robert Joly’s felicitous phrasing, the parts are governed by “une physique du récipient”<sup>48</sup>, participating in the disease process by virtue of their various shapes and material qualities, such as being loose and dry<sup>49</sup>. They are sites for disease and, as such, may be—and often are—targets of therapeutic intervention<sup>50</sup>. Yet, insofar as the disease is assimilated to circulating fluids, its relationship to specific parts is often contingent and temporary. The subtle subordination of the parts to the dynamics of the humors disturbs a narrative whereby the transfer of disease or pain from one part to another segues smoothly into the identification of affections according to sympathy. In acknowledging that disturbance we remain alert to the specificities of early models of the body and its pathologies, as well as historical discontinuity.

If, then, the majority of affections in the *Corpus* are sympathetic from one perspective—namely, a perspective focused on historical continuities—many of those same affections can also be seen, from a perspective focused on differences, not so much as proto-sympathetic but as distinctive elements in systems shaped by fluid dynamics rather than by their nodal parts. The differences are subtle. Yet they mean we should not too hastily assume that traveling affections are sympathetic *avant la lettre*.

The status of the parts in classical-era medical writing also complicates Galen’s retrojection of his sympathetically organized body onto “Hippocrates.” For, as we saw earlier, that body is entangled in Galen’s larger philosophical commitments, foremost among them the idea that the body has been organized in the best way possible in the service of its flourishing by a providential demiurge. Not only is such an organizing intelligence absent from the treatises of the *Corpus*, but a teleological understanding of the parts does not factor into these texts, as a number of commentators have recognized. As Beate Gundert writes, “parts may perform particular roles because they have given structures; there is never any hint that they have particular structures in order to fulfill given roles”<sup>51</sup>.

47. Gundert (art. cit. n. 16), p. 453. She continues: “the speculative element in Hippocratic anatomy, especially of the inner parts of the body, generally finds an explanation as the immediate result of humoral theory.”

48. Robert Joly, *Le niveau de la science hippocratique*, Paris, 1966, p. 46.

49. On looseness and dryness, see, e.g., *Loc.* 14 (v1 304 Littré=57,12-13 Craik); on the shape of the parts, see esp. *VM* 22 (1 626-634 Littré=149,1-152,17 Jouanna).

50. Gundert (art. cit. n. 16), pp. 462-463.

51. Gundert (art. cit. n. 16), p. 465. See also Hélène Ioannidi, “Les notions de partie du corps

The self-communicating body described by the author of *On Places in a Human Being* is a system that emerges from the network of vessels and hollow spaces, rather than a unity whose internal coordination is the result of design. In *On the Natural Faculties*, Galen admits that attraction can occur according to mechanical principles—primarily *horror vacui*—but privileges what he calls attraction based on the appropriateness of quality (οικειότης ποιότητος), which occurs through the workings of the natural faculties and manifests the technical intelligence of Nature<sup>52</sup>. By contrast, in *On Places in a Human Being*, as elsewhere in the *Hippocratic Corpus*, the attractive force of the vacuum takes pride of place.

Yet we would be misleading to “correct” Galen’s appropriation of Hippocrates by assigning early medical writers to the camp of his opponents, theorists for whom mechanical principles govern physiology and pathology alike (Asclepiades most obviously; Erasistratus is a more problematic case insofar as he professes a commitment to Nature as a technical agent but, like Anaxagoras in Plato’s *Phaedo*, fails in Galen’s eyes to follow through on it)<sup>53</sup>. It would be misleading for the same reasons that it is problematic to put Hippocrates at the origins of a vitalist tradition in Western medicine and philosophy, as Georges Canguilhem proposed<sup>54</sup>. For the early medical writers are not working within a domain defined by the poles of teleology and mechanism, as those writers working after Plato, Aristotle, and Epicurus arguably are<sup>55</sup>. What we find in these texts, rather—and often in the same text—are more or less implicit tendencies that will be self-consciously developed in opposition to one another in later

et d’organe”, in *Formes de pensée dans la Collection hippocratique*, François Lasserre and Philippe Mudry ed., Geneva, 1983, pp. 327-330 and Simon Byl, “Note sur la polysémie d’OPTANON et les origines du finalisme”, *L’Antiquité Classique* XL, 1971, pp. 121-133.

52. See Holmes (art. cit. n. 14).

53. On Erasistratus’ teleology, see H. von Staden, “Teleology and Mechanism: Aristotelian Biology and Early Hellenistic Medicine,” in *Aristotelische Biologie*, W. Kullmann and S. Föllinger ed., Stuttgart, 1997, pp. 183-208.

54. G. Canguilhem, *Knowledge of Life*, S. Geroulanos and D. Ginsburg, transl., New York, 2008, pp. 61-62. Canguilhem is of course simply repeating Galen’s gesture of appropriating Hippocrates as the origin of a tradition that is later articulated, as had countless physicians and philosophers in the intervening centuries: see *infra*, n. 57.

55. Cf., on this point, I. M. Lonie (art. cit. n. 27), pp. 128-131. Lonie sees in the cluster of texts *On Diseases IV*, *On the Seed*, and *On the Nature of Child* a possible Democritean influence and, hence, a possibly deliberate attempt to provide mechanistic explanations (see p. 123 for an excellent discussion of what is meant by “mechanistic”), yet he concludes that apart from the possible exception of these texts, “mechanism in Hippocratic medicine and pre-Socratic philosophy was *ante litteram* and unconscious” (p. 131). In my eyes, the absence of any explicit and polemical endorsement of mechanistic explanation in Lonie’s cluster of texts means that these texts are not an exception.

writers, especially Galen, much as the tendencies towards “dogmatism” and “empiricism” within early medical writing will be after the development of medical sects in the Hellenistic and imperial periods. By identifying these tendencies in terms of later theories, debates, and concepts, such as sympathy, we risk failing to see how they behave in their own conceptual environment and in non-oppositional terms.

Nevertheless, if we are reflecting instead on the tradition in medicine (and philosophy) of conceptualizing the relationship of parts to a whole, a text like *On Places in a Human Being* can be seen as an important early meditation on the part-to-whole relationship within the body, in its self-conscious reflections on the communication of pain and pleasure from the smallest parts to the whole, in its elaboration of how fluxes produce disease in different parts of the body, and in its conceptualization of a body that communicates with itself<sup>56</sup>. From this angle, the text takes its place in the rich history of imagining a body unified by its internal networks<sup>57</sup>.

The pre-history of sympathy is thus far from straightforward. The classical-era treatises of the *Hippocratic Corpus* harbor observations and beliefs that will cluster under the sign of sympathy in later medical writers, and Galen in particular: the migration of affections from one part of the body to another; the special “community” (*koinōniē*) created by certain parts of the body, especially the breasts and the uterus in the female body; and the idea of the body as an internally communicating whole. Yet using the rubric of sympathy to organize our understanding of these phenomena carries risks, inviting us to focus perhaps too much attention on the parts at the expense of the fluids through which the disease moves. In Galen’s particular appropriation of Hippocratic sympathy, the later opposition between a teleological organicism and more mechanistic models of the body anachronistically colors the earlier evidence. Yet even if the self-conscious reflection on the body as a “community” is limited in these texts, they nevertheless demonstrate a multi-faceted interest in imagining the body neither as a uniform whole nor as a collection of parts but as something in between.

Brooke HOLMES

56. Yet another text relevant to this history, which I do not have place to discuss at length here, is *On Regimen*, whose author speaks of the ἁρμογή and συμφωνία of the body, concepts that are commonly applied to cosmic unity and order before the introduction of sympathy in the Hellenistic period: see *Vict.* I 6 (VI 478-480 Littré=128,24-130,17 Joly-Byl).

57. Indeed, *On Places in a Human Being* was a text favored by eighteenth-century physicians seeking confirmation that Hippocrates anticipated their idea of the body as an organic machine: see Lonie (art. cit. n. 27), pp. 137-138 (discussing Friedrich Hoffmann), with n. 71.

## TABLE DES MATIÈRES

Avant-propos, par Jacques JOUANNA .....	p. I
Allocution d'accueil, par Michel ZINK .....	p. 1
Amneris ROSELLI, « Die Epidemien und das Corpus Hippocraticum: la ricerca sulle <i>Epidemie</i> ottanta anni dopo il libro di Karl Deichgräber » .....	p. 5
Elizabeth CRAIK, « The Hippocratic <i>Law</i> » .....	p. 23
Ignacio RODRÍGUEZ ALFAGEME, « Médecine hippocratique et médecine populaire » .....	p. 37
Paul POTTER, « Nosology and organization in <i>Barrenness</i> » .....	p. 59
Florence BOURBON, « Imaginaire et technique : les médecins hippocratiques face aux troubles du comportement » .....	p. 69
Laurence TOTELIN, « L'odeur des autres : femmes et odeurs à l'intersection de la pratique hippocratique et de la pratique religieuse » .....	p. 83
Mathias WITT, « The “Egoistic” Physician – considerations about the “Dark” Sides of Hippocratic Ethics and their possible Aristocratic Background » .....	p. 101
Brooke HOLMES, « Proto-Sympathy in the <i>Hippocratic Corpus</i> » .....	p. 123
Franco GIORGIANNI, « Numerologia ippocratica: considerazioni sul valore del numero negli scritti del cosiddetto “Autore C” tra teoria e osservazione » .....	p. 139
Nathalie ROUSSEAU, « La <i>Collection hippocratique</i> , témoin de l'émergence d'un vocabulaire médical rationnel : expression de la causalité et développement des substantifs en -της, -τητος » .....	p. 161

Elsa FERRACCI, « Imaginaire et rationalité dans le <i>Corpus hippocratique</i> : du rôle des images et des analogies » .....	p. 191
Isabella ANDORLINI, « Ippocratismo e medicina ellenistica in un trattato medico su papiro » .....	p. 217
Daniela MANETTI, « Alle origini dell'ippocratismo: fra IV e III sec. ».....	p. 231
Véronique BOUDON-MILLOT, « Le divin Hippocrate de Galien ».....	p. 253
Ivan GAROFALO, « Questions à propos des témoignages arabes du <i>Corpus Hippocratique</i> » .....	p. 271
Marie-Hélène MARGANNE, « Hippocrate dans un monde de chrétiens : la réception des traités hippocratiques dans la <i>chôra</i> égyptienne à la période byzantine (284-641) » .....	p. 283
Jacques JOUANNA, « Le <i>Glossaire</i> d'Érotien et le <i>Pronostic</i> d'Hippocrate. Découvertes et problèmes : du grain au divin » .....	p. 309
Philip J. VAN DER EIJK, « Hippocrate aristotélicien » ... ..	p. 347
Alessia GUARDASOLE, « L'image de l'“autre” Hippocrate dans le milieu chrétien » .....	p. 369
Brigitte MONDRAIN, « La place de la <i>Collection hippocratique</i> à Byzance d'après les manuscrits » .....	p. 385
Anna Maria IERACI BIO, « Nuovi apporti sull'ippocratismo a Bisanzio » ..	p. 401
Oliver OVERWIEN, « Syriac and Arabic translators of Hippocratic texts ». p.	421
Vincent DÉROCHE, « L'image de la médecine hippocratique à Byzance »	p. 437
Roberto LO PRESTI, « La place d'Hippocrate dans les grandes querelles médicales du XVII <sup>e</sup> siècle : le cas du débat sur la circulation sanguine »	p. 461
Liste des auteurs.....	p. 483